A client-side CardSpace-Liberty integration architecture by Alrodhan, Waleed & Mitchell, Chris
A Client-side CardSpace-Liberty Integration Architecture
Waleed A. Alrodhan
Royal Holloway, University of London
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX
United Kingdom
W.A.Alrodhan@rhul.ac.uk
Chris J. Mitchell
Royal Holloway, University of London
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX
United Kingdom
C.Mitchell@rhul.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Over the last few years, many identity management schemes,
frameworks and system specifications have been proposed;
however these various schemes and frameworks are typically
not interoperable. In this paper we propose an approach to
enable interoperation between two of the most prominent
identity management schemes, namely the Liberty Alliance
Project scheme (specifically the ID-FF LEC Profile) and the
Microsoft CardSpace (formerly known as InfoCard) scheme.
This integration should enhance interoperability by enabling
users to make use of identity management systems even if the
system participants are using different schemes. The main
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed integration
model are also investigated.
1. INTRODUCTION
It has become common for Internet users to access mul-
tiple independent systems in a single working session, and
hence users have a need for multiple digital identities. How-
ever, managing these digital identities can be a complex and
difficult job, and to solve this dilemma a number of Iden-
tity Federation systems have been proposed and deployed.
These systems are typically not interoperable, which makes
it difficult to use them in open environments such as the
Internet.
This paper proposes an approach to address this problem.
Specifically, it proposes a method to enable interoperation
between the Liberty Alliance Project scheme and the Mi-
crosoft CardSpace scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides an overview of the Liberty Alliance Project
and the Microsoft CardSpace identity management system.
Section 3 presents the proposed integration model. In sec-
tion 4 we provide an operational analysis of the proposed
integration model, section 5 contains a brief review of re-
lated work, and section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. THELIBERTYALLIANCEPROJECTAND
MICROSOFT CARDSPACE
This section provides a brief introduction to the two iden-
tity management architectures for which interoperation is
enabled, namely the Liberty Alliance Project scheme and
Microsoft CardSpace.
2.1 The Liberty Alliance Project and the ID-
FF Single Sign-On Profiles
The Liberty Alliance Project (www.projectliberty.org) is
an industry collaboration that was started in December 2001
by 16 major companies, including Sun, GM, United Airlines,
and France Te´le´com. This collaboration now involves more
than 150 members, including government agencies, compa-
nies, banks and universities. According to the project web-
site, there are more than 400 million Liberty-enabled iden-
tities and clients across the world.
The Liberty Alliance Project (henceforth abbreviated to
Liberty) aims to build open standard-based specifications for
federated identity, provide interoperability testing, and to
help provide solutions to identity theft. Liberty also aims to
establish best practices and business guidelines for identity
federation.
Figure 1: The Liberty model.
Figure 1 shows the general Liberty model, which is essen-
tially a single sign-on model [2]. In this model, a principal
(or user) can federate its various identities to a single iden-
tity issued by an identity provider, so that the user can ac-
cess services provided by service providers belonging to the
same circle of trust by authenticating just once to the iden-
tity provider. This, of course, relies on a pre-established
trust relationship between the identity provider and every
service provider in the circle of trust. The model provides
a level of pseudonymity and unlinkability via the use of
pseudonyms instead of real identifiers in the communications
between the identity provider and the service providers, and
this enhances user privacy. In the example shown in figure
1, the principal has federated its identities within two dis-
tinct circles of trust, which results in the user having two
identities, one for circle of trust A and the other for circle of
trust B. It merits mentioning that these two identities could
also be federated, but this would require a pre-established
trust relationship between the identity providers.
As shown in figure 2, the Liberty implementation spec-
ifications are divided into three frameworks: the Identity
Federation Framework (ID-FF) [12], the Identity Web Ser-
vices Framework (ID-WSF) [11] and the Service Interface
Specifications (ID-SIS) [5] and [6]. In this paper, we focus
on the ID-FF.
Figure 2: The Liberty Frameworks.
The ID-FF provides approaches for implementing the fed-
eration and single sign-on model, and the techniques needed
for that model, including session management and iden-
tity/account linkage. In order to realise this federation model,
a set of profiles is required (so called ID-FF Liberty pro-
files). An ID-FF Liberty profile may best be defined as the
combination of message content specifications and message
transport mechanisms for a single client type (that is, user
agent) [3].
There are many types of ID-FF Liberty profile, includ-
ing Single Sign-On and Federation Profiles, Register Name
Identifier Profiles, Identity Federation Termination Notifica-
tion Profiles, Single Logout Profiles, Identity Provider Intro-
duction, NameIdentifier Mapping Profile and NameIdentifier
Encryption Profile. In this paper we are primarily concerned
with the Single Sign-On and Federation Profiles. The cur-
rently defined Single Sign-On profiles are the Artifact profile,
the Browser POST profile and the Liberty-enabled client
and proxy (LEC) profile [3].
2.2 Microsoft CardSpace
CardSpace is the name for a Microsoft WinFX software
component that is built on the concept of the“identity meta-
system”. This identity metasystem is designed to comply
with the Laws of Identity, as promulgated by Microsoft [1].
The metasystem provides a way to represent identities us-
ing claims, and a means to bridge technology and organi-
sational boundaries using claims transformations [7]. The
CardSpace identity management architecture is designed to
provide the user with control over his digital identities in
a user friendly manner, and to tackle identity management
security problems such as breaches of privacy and identity
theft, with no single identity authority control. CardSpace
works with Internet Explorer browsers (CardSpace plug-ins
for browsers other than Microsoft Internet Explorer can also
be developed, such as the Firefox Plug-in1).
The concept behind CardSpace is relatively simple; it
is based on the identification process we experience in the
real world when using physical identification cards. In the
CardSpace system, an identity provider issues virtual iden-
tification cards (named InfoCards) to users, who can later
use them to identify themselves to any service provider who
trusts this identity provider. It merits mentioning here that
the InfoCard is stored in the user’s machine and does not
contain any security-sensitive information.
CardSpace is an identity federation model that essentially
facilitates a single sign-on service, although it is not clear
from the published Microsoft papers and documents how
single sign-on sessions are handled within the metasystem.
The CardSpace metasystem makes use of Web Services (WS-
*) protocols to achieve its objectives. Note that most of
these protocols make use of a Security Token Service [4].
2.3 Message Flows within the Liberty ID-FF
LEC Profile and the CardSpace Frame-
work
Before describing the proposed integration model, we briefly
describe the message flows within both the Liberty ID-FF
LEC profile and the CardSpace framework. There are three
main roles within both identity management architectures:
1. The Identity Provider or Identity Issuer (IdP), which
issues the identity to the user;
2. The Service Provider (SP), as referred to in the Liberty
specifications, or the Relying Party (RP), in Microsoft
terminology; the SP or RP needs to identify the user
before providing services to him/her;
3. The Principal or User.
It is important to mention that, in order for a principal to
employ Liberty federation using the LEC profile, the prin-
cipal must possess a Liberty-Enabled browser in order to
handle and understand the messages sent and received. To
make the browser Liberty-Enabled, the principal needs to
install certain java components on the machine; such com-
ponents can be downloaded freely from the Internet (e.g. the
SecureID ID-FF 1.1 and ID-FF 1.2 Java Toolkits2, and the
Sun FederationSPAdapter3).
Figure 3 shows the message flow within the ID-FF LEC
profile, if we assume that the client has already been au-
thenticated by the IdP. Note that the Liberty-Enabling
component must be installed on the Principal’s PC prior
to performing the protocol. The main steps in the protocol
are as follows:
1. User Agent → SP : Service Request (HTTP Request
with Liberty Enabled Header)
1http://xmldap.blogspot.com/2006/05/firefox-identity-
selector.html
2http://www.sourceid.org
3http://docs.sun.com/source/819-4682
2. SP→ User Agent : Authentication Request +“option-
ally” an IdP List
3. User Agent or User : Selects the IdP to be used
4. User Agent → IdP : SAML-Assertion Request
5. IdP → User Agent : SAML-Assertion Response
6. User Agent→ SP : Authentication Response + SAML-
Assertion (within an HTML Form)
7. SP → User Agent : Service Granted!
Figure 3: The ID-FF LEC profile message flow.
The SAML messages in steps 4 and 5 are bound to SOAP,
which is carried over an SSL connection to provide confiden-
tiality (integrity is preserved using an XML-Signature). As
shown in the figure, how the IdP is selected in step 3 is not
specified in the Liberty specifications.
Figure 4 shows the message flow within the CardSpace
framework. As shown in the figure, there is an additional
component here, namely the Security Token Service (hence-
forth abbreviated to STS), which is responsible for the se-
curity policy and token management within the IdP (and
optionally within the RP). The User Agent here is essen-
tially an CardSpace enabled browser (also called the Service
Requestor). Note that the CardSpace component must be
installed on the Principal’s PC prior to step 3 of the proto-
col. The main steps in the protocol are as follows:
1. User Agent → RP : HTTP GET Login HTML Page
Request
2. RP → User Agent : HTML Login Page + CardSpace
Tags (XHTML or HTML object tags)
3. User Agent ↔ RP-STS : User Agent retrieves Policy
via WS-SecurityPolicy
4. User Agent ↔ User : User picks an InfoCard
5. User Agent ↔ IdP : User Authentication
6. User Agent ↔ IdP-STS : User Agent retrieves secu-
rity token via WS-MetadataExchange and WS-Trust
7. User Agent → RP-STS : User Agent presents the
security token via WS-Trust
8. RP → User Agent : Welcome, you are now logged in!
Figure 4: The MS-CardSpace profile message flow.
Unlike the ID-FF LEC profile, in Step 4 of the CardSpace
message flow the user is presented with the InfoCards that
can be used to identify himself to that particular RP, and
picks one of them. The WS-MetadataExchange and WS-
Trust messages in step 6 are transported using SOAP, which
is carried via an SSL connection to provide confidentiality
(integrity is preserved using an XML signature). If the RP
does not have an STS server, the messages in steps 3 and 7
will be carried using HTTP over an SSL/TLS channel.
In the remainder of this paper we assume that all SPs and
IdPs support at least one of the two identity architectures
(either Liberty or CardSpace, or both). In such a situation,
Windows users will face one of the following two scenarios:
• Scenario A: The Identity Provider/Identity Issuer sup-
ports both identity management architectures (Liberty
and CardSpace). In this case the IdP perform the diffi-
cult task of maintaining two different identity architec-
tures, thereby providing flexibility to users when they
federate their identities with the SPs or RPs. Users are
able to access services provided by Service Providers
regardless of which identity management architecture
they adopt.
• Scenario B : The Identity Provider/Identity Issuer sup-
ports only one identity management architecture (ei-
ther Liberty or CardSpace). In this case, users are
only able to access Service Providers using the identity
management architecture supported by their Identity
Issuer or IdP.
In Scenario B, Windows users have a compatibility prob-
lem if the Relying Party is CardSpace-Enabled while their
IdP is Liberty-Enabled, or vice versa. Table 1 shows the ap-
plicability of the identity management systems in all of the
possible scenarios that might occur; L.E. stands for Liberty
Enabled, and CS.E. stands for CardSpace Enabled. The
(X) sign indicates that there is no compatibility problem,
whereas the (×) sign indicates the opposite.
3. THE INTEGRATION MODEL
There is a noticeable similarity between the message flow
within the ID-FF LEC profile and the message flow within
the CardSpace framework. This similarity can be exploited
in order to integrate the two identity management archi-
Table 1: The applicability of the identity manage-
ment architectures.
User L.E. IdP CS.E. IdP L.E. IdP CS.E. IdP
Agent L.E. SP CS.E. RP CS.E. RP L.E. SP
Unenhanced × × × ×
L.E. X × × ×
CS.E. × X × ×
L.E. and CS.E. X X × ×
tectures. This section presents the motivation for this in-
tegration proposal, and describes the proposed integration
model.
3.1 Motivation
Liberty is currently the leading identity management ar-
chitecture for identity federation, and it has gained the ac-
ceptance of a number of technology-leading companies and
organisations. By contrast, the CardSpace metasystem cur-
rently only works on the Windows operating system (this
seems likely to continue, at least in the near future), and is
deployed freely with Windows Vista, with backwards com-
patibility with Windows XP. Given the wide use of Win-
dows, CardSpace is likely to have a significant impact despite
this restriction. Thus, enabling integration between these
two systems is likely to be of significant benefit to a wide
range of service providers and users. It seems that interop-
eration between Liberty and CardSpace can be achieved by
integrating the frameworks.
The CardSpace identity management architecture consists
of two parts:
1. The user agent supporting components: i.e. the service
requestor and the identity selector. These components
are responsible for managing the cards and communi-
cating with other parties in the model. It appears that
these components could be integrated with the Liberty
ID-WSF services; however, how this might be achieved
is beyond the scope of this paper.
2. The Identity Framework : i.e. the message flow and
the rules for communication between the parties. This
framework is similar to the Liberty ID-FF LEC pro-
file, in which the user agent is “Liberty-enabled” in the
same way as the user agent is “CardSpace-enabled” in
the CardSpace framework.
3.2 Integrating the two schemes
In the integration model we propose, we introduce an iden-
tity management architecture adaptor that is both Liberty-
enabled and CardSpace-enabled. We propose placing this
adaptor in the user’s machine. This gives the user the abil-
ity to use any IdP, and access a service provided by any RP
or SP. This means that, in the presence of such an adaptor,
we can change the last two entries in the fifth row of table 1
to (X) instead of (×), which implies that such a user would
have the ability to make use of an identity system regard-
less of the identity management architecture adopted by the
RP or the SP. That is, this integration model is designed to
resolve the incompatibility situation that may occur if the
IdP is Liberty-enabled and the RP is CardSpace-enabled, or
vice versa.
Before describing the proposed integration model, we out-
line a major difference between the scope of the Liberty ID-
FF and the CardSpace framework. The CardSpace frame-
work’s main goal is to support the authentication of a user
by a trusted third party (i.e. an IdP) and the provision of
assertions by the trusted third party to the SP that claims
regarding attributes of the user are correct. By contrast, in
Liberty, the ID-FF is designed to achieve Identity Federation
by asserting to the SP that the user has been successfully
authenticated by a trusted third party (i.e. the IdP) using an
authentication method, and no claims (i.e. user attributes)
are involved in the authentication process. Nevertheless,
asserting user attributes by a trusted third party can be
achieved using the Liberty protocols; however, this falls un-
der the Liberty ID-WSF, which is a different framework, as
discussed earlier in this paper.
The identity management architecture adaptor proposed
here is a piece of software installed on the user’s machine
which understands both the Liberty and CardSpace frame-
works, and their message flows and formats. The adaptor’s
main job is to interpose itself between IdPs and SPs/RPs ad-
hering to different identity management architectures, in or-
der to translate particular messages generated by one party
to the other. We consider operational details of the identity
management architecture adaptor later in this section.
Before presenting the integration model and its message
flow, we note the following restrictions on its operation:
1. Given that the Liberty specifications are based only on
SAML-Assertion tokens, only SAML-Assertion tokens
are permitted within the integration model, i.e. other
security tokens supported by CardSpace (e.g. Kerberos
v5 tickets) are not permitted. The SAML-Assertion
tokens will simply be forwarded from the IdP to the
SP/RP.
2. For the proof of rightful possession of the security to-
ken, only asymmetric techniques are permitted. In the
asymmetric proof technique, the IdP inserts the pub-
lic key of the User Agent in the security token, so that
the User Agent can use its private key to prove rightful
possession of the token to the RP (or SP). There is a
clear resemblance between the CardSpace asymmetric
proof-key technique [8], and SAML holder-of-key con-
firmation method [9]; hence, mapping between these
techniques is viable using a relatively simple process.
3. For a CardSpace-enabled RP and a Liberty-enabled
IdP, the identity management architecture adaptor will
discard any token freshness restrictions requests im-
posed by the RP, since the Liberty-enabled IdP may
not be capable of understanding them.
In the CardSpace framework, the claims to be asserted
in the RP Security Policy are represented as attributes of
an Attribute Statement, that is contained within SAML-
Assertion requests and responses exchanged before the se-
curity token can be retrieved from the IdP. However, in
the Liberty ID-FF, the IdP does not expect any SAML
Attribute Statements in the AuthenticationRequestEnvelope,
i.e. the SOAP envelope that carries the authentication re-
quests. This presents a problem that must be solved before
the Identity Management Architecture Adaptor can convert
the relevant messages. We propose two possible solutions to
this problem.
1. We could convert the claims in the CardSpace Security
Policy into attributes within a SAML Attribute State-
ment in the AuthenticationRequestEnvelope. However,
for this to work, we must ensure that the IdP is able to
process such statements in order to assert them in the
AuthenticationResponseEnvelope. However, this solu-
tion goes outside the Liberty standards, and would
potentially require the Liberty-Enabling software com-
ponent to be modified.
2. Alternatively, we could make the integration model
only accept CardSpace Security Polices with no claims
listed, and hence the RP that issues the polices will
only require an assertion that the user has been au-
thenticated by a trusted third party. However, this
solution will severely impact on the usability of the
integration model.
Figure 5 shows the message flow for the integration model
in the case where the IdP is CardSpace-enabled and the SP
is Liberty-enabled. Note that the Liberty-Enabling compo-
nent must be active on the Principal’s PC prior to perform-
ing the protocol, and the CardSpace component must be
active on the Principal’s PC prior to step 3 of the protocol.
Here, the message flow would be:
1. User Agent → SP : Service Request (HTTP Request
with Liberty Enabled Header)
2. SP→ User Agent : Authentication Request +“option-
ally” an IdPs List
- [The identity management architecture adaptor
converts the Liberty Authentication Request, re-
ceived from the SP, into a CardSpace RP Retrieved
Security Policy, and forwards it to the CardSpace-
enabling component]
3. User Agent ↔ User : User Picks an InfoCard
4. User Agent ↔ IdP : User Authentication
5. User Agent ↔ IdP-STS : User Agent retrieves secu-
rity token via WS-MetadataExchange and WS-Trust
- [The identity management architecture adaptor
converts the CardSpace Retrieved Security To-
ken, received from the IdP-STS, into a Liberty
Authentication Response, and forwards it to the
Liberty-enabling component]
6. User Agent→ SP : Authentication Response + SAML-
Assertion (within the HTML Form)
7. SP → User Agent : Service Granted!
Figure 6 shows the message flow for the integration model
in the case where the IdP is Liberty-enabled and the RP is
CardSpace-enabled. Note that the Liberty-Enabling com-
ponent must be active on the Principal’s PC prior to step
4 of the protocol, and the CardSpace component must be
active on the Principal’s PC prior to step 3 of the protocol.
Here, the message flow would be:
1. User Agent → RP : HTTP GET Login HTML Page
Request
2. RP → User Agent : HTML Login Page + CardSpace
Tags (XHTML or HTML object tags)
3. User Agent ↔ RP-STS : User Agent retrieves Policy
via WS-SecurityPolicy
- [The identity management architecture adaptor
converts the CardSpace RP Security Policy, re-
ceived from the RP, into a Liberty Authentica-
tion Request, and forwards it to the Liberty-
Enabling component]
4. User Agent or User : Selects the IdP to be used
5. User Agent → IdP : SAML-Assertion Request
6. IdP → User Agent : SAML-Assertion Response
- [The identity management architecture adaptor
converts the Liberty Authentication Response,
received from the IdP, into a CardSpace IdP-STS
Retrieved Security Token, and forwards it to
the CardSpace component]
7. User Agent → RP-STS : User Agent presents the
security token via WS-Trust
8. RP → User Agent : Welcome, you are now logged in!
Figure 5: Message flow within the integration model
(a).
As described above, the identity management architecture
adaptor interposes itself between the IdP and the SP/RP
in order to translate messages at certain stages of the pro-
tocol run. The identity management architecture adaptor
must be able to make four types of message conversion, in-
cluding two token forwarding operations. Figure 7 shows
the message types that need to be converted by the identity
management architecture adaptor, along with the respective
message formats.
Thus, the identity management architecture adaptor soft-
ware must perform two types of task:
• Convert the formats of four types of message.
• Forward the converted messages to either liberty en-
abling or CardSpace software components.
For the first task, implementing the required message con-
versions should not be difficult, since all the messages for-
mats are open and published (XML definitions). However,
the second task is not so straightforward, since it requires
a well-defined set of APIs in order for the identity manage-
ment architecture adaptor software to communicate with the
Liberty-Enabling and CardSpace components. The precise
Figure 6: Message flow within the integration model
(b).
details of the operation of the adaptor will therefore depend
on how these components are implemented. Indeed, it is
possible that the adaptor could be integrated into the re-
spective components.
Figure 7: Message format conversions.
4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTEGRATION
MODEL
The integration model takes advantage of the similarity
between the ID-FF LEC profile and the CardSpace frame-
work, and this should help to reduce the effort required for
full system integration. Moreover, the proposed integration
model is designed to be implemented without the need for
technical cooperation between Microsoft and Liberty.
Implementing such a model might be non-trivial task, but
the benefits could be significant. If interoperability between
leading identity management systems is not supported, then
this could be a major obstacle to the global adoption of such
schemes.
The proposed model is designed to integrate two frame-
works with somewhat different scopes. This difference in
scope has given rise to the most serious obstacle facing this
integration model, namely the dilemma of translating the
CardSpace Security Policy claims. Neither of the two so-
lutions proposed in this paper are ideal, since they either
involve reducing the applicability of the scheme, or making
modifications to the core of the Liberty-Enabling software
component.
One potential limitation of the proposed model is that the
user agent must be both CardSpace-enabled and Liberty-
enabled. However, Windows Vista user agents (i.e. browsers)
will, by default, be CardSpace-enabled, and to make the
browsers Liberty-enabled will simply require the installation
of certain java scripts on user machines; as a result this does
not seem to be a major issue. Another possible limitation
of the proposed model is the added restrictions on the token
type, encryption and freshness requests; these restrictions
will prevent the users from utilising certain features offered
by CardSpace. However, these restrictions only affect the
CardSpace framework because, from the Liberty perspec-
tive, token handling will remain the same [10].
A further possible limitation is the necessity for interac-
tions between the adaptor and the CardSpace metasystem;
because of the closed nature of CardSpace, this might not be
straightforward, unless a well-defined set of APIs is publicly
available. Finally, use of the proposed integration model will
result in a delay at the user system while the identity man-
agement architecture adaptor performs the necessary con-
versions; however, any such delay is likely to be very small.
5. RELATEDWORK
Recently, the Bandit4 project, which is part of the Hig-
gins5 project, has developed an open source integration sys-
tem between Liberty and CardSpace (a demo is available at
the project’s web site). Although the source code is pro-
vided, it seems that there is no published specification of
the integration system, which makes it difficult to discover
exactly how the Bandit scheme works.
One obvious difference between the integration scheme we
propose in this paper and the Bandit integration scheme re-
lates to the location of the integration adapter. Unlike the
scheme discussed above, in Bandit the integration adapter
is placed on the RP (or SP), not on the user machine. We
believe that placing the integration adapter on the user ma-
chine increases the usability of the scheme. It is much sim-
pler for a user to deploy an integration scheme, and it seems
likely that many well-known service providers will only sup-
port a single identity management system for operational
and commercial reasons.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed a model enabling integra-
tion of Liberty and CardSpace. This integration model takes
advantage of the similarity in the message flows between the
Liberty ID-FF LEC framework and the CardSpace frame-
work. The proposed integration model is based on a client-
side identity management architecture adaptor that converts
4http://www.bandit-project.org
5http://www.eclipse.org/higgins
the format of messages within the message flows of the two
schemes. We have also presented an analysis of the main
limitations and benefits of our proposed integration model.
The model is designed to integrate two frameworks with
somewhat different scopes, and this has caused certain tech-
nical problems, in particular in translating the CardSpace
claims. In this paper we have suggested possible solutions
for such problems.
We believe that enabling interoperation between the two
most prominent identity federation architectures could be
of major benefit to both the users and producers of these
systems.
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